Abstract: Private foundations must spend at least five percent of their assets each year on charitable purposes. This paper examines actual tax return data from a sample of private foundations between 1994 and 1998. It examines the amount and timeliness of their charitable expenditures. It also examines the level of charitable administrative expenses per dollar of grants. It finds that the amounts currently transferred to charitable beneficiaries is negatively correlated with the fraction of operating expenses paid to foundation officers, directors, and trustees, and is positively associated with the fraction of current revenues from new contributions.
INTRODUCTION
Non-profit organizations in the United States own financial assets worth about $1 trillion. Nearly half of these assets are owned by approximately 50,000 private foundations, with the remainder being held by public charities. A public charity is a §501(c)(3) organization whose financial support is provided by the general public ( §509(a)). In contrast, a private foundation is a §501(c)(3) organization whose financial support is provided by a small group of people, usually members of the same family. The foundation in turn makes grants to §501(c)(3) public charities. Private foundations are similar to public charities in that contributions are tax deductible and endowment income is exempt from the federal income tax. But unlike public charities, most foundations simply make grants instead of engaging in charitable activities directly. In the aggregate, these private foundations represent a privately controlled endowment whose assets are held for the benefit of current and future public charities.
2 They act as a conduit that transfers private wealth today to charitable beneficiaries in the future in a way that generates current charitable contribution deductions and tax-exempt investment returns between the time the assets are transferred to the foundation and the time the assets are transferred from the foundation to a public charity.
The purpose of our paper is to use the private foundation tax returns (IRS form 990-PF) of over 4,000 foundations between 1994 and 1998 to address two issues for this large and important sector of the U.S. economy. First, we examine the firm-level characteristics of these organizations. In particular, we explore the causes of growth of our sample foundations as well as the relations between the amounts they are legally required to pay out (i.e., the "distributable amount") to the amounts actually paid for charitable purposes (i.e., the "qualifying distributions"). Second, we test empirically hypotheses that relate the distribution policies to foundation characteristics such as size, level of current donations, and the extent to which the foundation is professionally managed.
Because the deduction for a contribution to a private foundation occurs when the foundation receives the funds instead of when it distributes the funds to a public charity, Congress became concerned that foundations were unnecessarily retaining their income in order to advance the private interests of the foundation donors. These concerns led to the enactment of several tax provisions in 1969 designed to ensure that private foundations fulfill a charitable purpose (Troyer 2000) . One of these provisions requires that foundations spend at least five percent of their assets (i.e., the distributable amount) on charitable grants or charitable administrative expenditures each year ( §4942). This so-called "minimum distribution requirement," the details of which have changed several times over the years, is designed to prevent excessive retention of assets within foundations. Steuerle (1977) examines the theoretical foundations of the minimum distribution requirement.
The minimum distribution requirement is the subject of considerable controversy, with some advocating an increase in the percentage of assets that must be annually paid out while others defend the current rules. Supporters of the status quo argue that an increase would likely deplete the real value of foundation assets, which would in turn cause a decrease in the real level of payout over time (Cambridge Associates 2000) . By avoiding asset depletion, the current rules allow foundations to maintain the real value of their endowment in perpetuity (Craig 1999 ). This in turn preserves an endowment for the benefit of the charitable sector, controlled by ostensibly prudent stewards who are not subject to pressures to meet immediate needs at the cost of future unmet needs.
Those advocating an increase in the percentage of assets that must be paid out point to the rapid growth of the private foundation sector, and assert that the field has become "more concerned with investment banking than with grantmaking" (Mehrling 1999) . They reject the idea that perpetuity is a legitimate goal of a charitable foundation. If charitable expenditures and operating expenses are less than the sum of new contributions and investment returns, the assets of a private foundation will grow in perpetuity, an ever-expanding financial pyramid forever glorifying the family name. Deep and Frumkin (2001) summarize the arguments for and against changing the minimum distribution requirement. They also express a concern that the five percent rule has become a ceiling as well as a floor on distributions, leading to convergence among foundations.
As this convergence is unlikely to represent the most effective way to carry out the mission for all foundations, they regard the five percent payout requirement as a failure. We do not seek to address the appropriateness of the current payout rules. Our intent is to more fully describe the foundation sector by examining individual foundation characteristics and to develop and test hypotheses related to the current payout regime. By examining how foundations respond to current rules, we hope to shed light on how the sector would be affected by any changes in these rules. This information is of value to policymakers and others concerned with foundations' role in the U.S. economy.
Some facts related to foundations are clear. First, the foundation sector of the economy is rapidly expanding. Second, on average foundations tend to not distribute substantially more than they are legally required (Deep and Frumpkin 2001) . These fact patterns are consistent with either foundations acting as prudent stewards for future generations (by insuring the foundation's financial stability) or acting as self-interested pyramid builders. These facts raise two important issues. First, is the growth of the foundation sector attributable to investment returns or is it additional contributions that drive this growth? Second, do foundations deliberately minimize or otherwise delay their payouts in ways that perpetuate themselves?
The data we use for our analysis consists of the foundations' IRS Form 990-PF. Each private foundation files an annual Form 990-PF that discloses its current income statement, balance sheet, and compliance with the minimum distribution requirement. These returns are publicly available from either the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) or directly from the IRS. Using this data, we first examine the growth of our sample and find that during the period 1995 to 1998 the total assets of our sample nearly doubled from $149 billion to $279 billion, an annual growth rate of about 17 percent. Asset appreciation during the period was about $156 billion while additional contributions were $26 billion, suggesting that the majority of the growth in total assets was from appreciation. Grants paid to charities were about $43 billion. These results suggest that existing foundations are expanding rather rapidly and that charitable payouts during the period were only 24 percent of total income. It is important to note that this period of time coincided with a bull market. We then describe the features of the distributable amounts, or the amounts that foundations are annually required either give to charities or spend on internal operating expenses, and compare this the amounts actually provided to charities and consumed on internal activities. Our results show that in the aggregate, foundations in our sample spend 1.29 times the legally required amounts either as grants to charities or as charitable administrative expenses. For our sample, charitable expenses and asset purchase represent about nine percent of total foundation payouts. Of particular note is the wide variation in the sample with respect to these measures, suggesting that any single characterization of the foundation sector is likely to be misleading. Although it is true that some foundations pay out only the legally required minimum amount, many foundations pay out substantially more than is legally required.
We next examine the foundation characteristics that are associated with variations in distribution policies of private foundations. We select three measures of the tendency to minimize or delay the amounts paid to §501(c)(3) public charities as our dependent variables. Our third dependent variable is the ratio of charitable administrative expenditures to grants.
Both internal administrative expenses and grants to charities qualify towards meeting the distribution requirements. This variable captures the extent to which a foundation has a tendency to spend its qualifying distributions on administration rather than as grants to charities.
We hypothesize that large, professionally managed private foundations with low levels of current donations will be more likely to minimize or delay amounts paid to public charities and to spend relatively higher amounts on internal administrative expenses rather than on grants to charities. We use the natural logarithm of the fair market value of assets as our measure of size.
We use two measures of professional management, the ratio of compensation paid to officers, directors, and trustees to operating expenses and the ratio of professional fees to operating expenses. We use the ratio of contributions to total revenue as our measure of current donations.
Our results suggest that, consistent with our hypotheses, foundations that tend to defer distributions are larger, professionally managed foundations that receive a low level of current contributions. Our hypotheses relating to the level of distributions are supported with respect to our measures of professional management and current donations, but not with respect to size.
Our hypotheses regarding the ratio of charitable administrative expenditures to grants was supported with respect to our officers' compensation and current donations variables, but not with respect to our size or professional fee variables. Whether the behavior of large, professionally managed foundations that receive a low level of current contributions reflects conservation of resources for future charitable beneficiaries (prudent stewards) or self-interested wealth accumulation (pyramid builders) is a contentious issue that we do not try to resolve.
The next section of our paper describes our data. The following section documents the growth of the foundation sector and discusses minimum distribution requirement. Section three presents our hypotheses and how we test them. Section four presents our results. Section five concludes the paper. We exclude private operating foundations, which operate charitable programs rather than make grants and face a different set of tax rules. We require that all observations be included in each of the five years (i.e., a balanced pooled sample), which reduces our sample to 4,239 annual observations across the years 1994 to 1998. Although each year contains less than ten percent of the total foundations by number, our sample represents over 60 percent of the total assets of all foundations. For 1998, our sample contains $279 billion in foundation assets and includes the 25 largest private non-operating foundations, each of which owned assets of over $1 billion at the end of 1998.
DATA

FOUNDATION GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION CHARACTERISTICS Foundation Growth
Table 1 presents our sample univariate statistics. The average annual revenues are $6.2 million, which consists of additional contributions from donors ($1.5 million) and investment and other revenues ($4.7 million). Median contributions are zero, so over half of the sample foundations receive no additional contributions. Total annual operating expenses average $500,000, of which 27 percent are for professional fees ($133,000) and 12 percent are for officers' compensation ($59,000). Administrative expenditures related to charitable activities (as opposed to investment activities) average $231,000. Grants paid to charities average $2.3 million. Total assets average $50 million and consist primarily of investment assets ($45 million). Average total liabilities are $1.3 million, less than three percent of average total assets.
The median foundation has no liabilities.
The assets of our sample nearly doubled between 1995 and 1998, as shown in Table 2 . Of the gross asset increase of $182 billion (contributions plus investment income plus unrealized asset appreciation), 24 percent was paid out as grants to charities, 5 percent was spent on operating the foundations, and 71 percent was retained within the foundation. Of course, this time period featured a very strong bull market, which tends to increase all three sources of gross asset increases.
Foundation Distribution Requirements
Distributable Amount Table 3 presents a calculation of the distributable amount. Although there is no upper limit on the annual amount of funds foundations can spend on charitable purposes, they must spend at least five percent of the fair market value of their net investment assets (less certain reductions) on charitable purposes. Investment assets are total assets as reported on part II, line 16(c) of the Form 990-PF, less the average value during the year (instead of the end-of-year value) of assets used in carrying out charitable activities (such as a building used to provide offices for employees managing the foundation), valuation discounts for blockage, associated acquisition indebtedness, and allowed cash balances. 4 These reductions allowed by §4942(e) exclude assets which are either directly used by the foundation to conduct its charitable purpose or are not available for payout.
The calculation of the distributable amount begins with a foundation's minimum investment return, which is defined as five percent of net investment assets as defined above.
The minimum investment return is reduced by the excise tax on investment income imposed by §4940, unrelated business income taxes, and increased for recoveries of amounts that were previously treated as distributions. Investment income taxes are excise taxes based on one or two percent of a foundation's net investment income. 5 Unrelated business income taxes are those levied on net profits from a foundation's ancillary (non-charitable purpose) activities. Table 3 shows that the average adjustment for investment income taxes, unrelated business income taxes, and recoveries is $64,000, $1,000, and $22,000, respectively. The average distributable amount is $2.2 million. The ratio of the distributable amount to the minimum investment return for our sample has a mean (median) of 98% (97%), and diverges from one primarily due to the excise tax on investment income under §4940. Less than ten percent of our sample has unrelated business income taxes or recoveries.
Qualifying Distributions
Qualifying distributions represent amounts paid or set-aside for charitable purposes. The distributable amount calculated above must be paid out as a qualifying distribution in the current or following year to avoid penalties. Current year qualifying distributions in excess of distributable amounts are carried forward for up to five subsequent years and can be used to offset future distributable amounts. The foundation is given one year to make up any deficit caused by current year qualifying distributions being less than the distributable amount. Failure to distribute after then results in an initial excise tax of 15 percent ( §4942(a)), followed by a 100 percent excise tax if the failure to distribute is not corrected within the next year ( §4942(b)). charities. These findings suggest that, although foundations could theoretically meet their distribution requirements by spending funds on themselves (such as improvements to the foundations' offices or officers' salaries) rather than paying them out to charities, the average foundation directs most of its cash outlays towards charities.
HYPOTHESES
In this section, we present our hypotheses regarding the characteristics of private foundations that are associated with variations in foundation behavior. The intent of our analysis is to examine the factors that are associated with a foundation's proclivity to retain assets or spend on administration instead of charitable grants. We measure this proclivity in three ways.
First, we consider the variation in the ratio of qualifying distributions to prior year's distributable amount (DISTRIBUTIONS). This ratio captures the variation in how much a foundation spends on charitable purposes as compared to the legally required minimum.
Second, we try to explain which types of foundations delay making distributions as long as possible by examining the ratio of undistributed income from the current year to the current year distributable amount (DELAY). Foundations need not pay out the current year's distributable amounts until the end of the following year. Foundations that wish to keep control of their assets for as long as possible will choose to put off satisfying the minimum distribution requirement until the following year.
Third, we try to explain the variation in the ratio of charitable administrative expenditures to grants (EXPENSES) to see which types of foundations spend relatively more on charitable administration per dollar of grants. Because charitable administrative expenditures are considered to be qualifying distributions, foundations can at least partially meet the minimum distribution requirement by spending funds on administration rather than (or in addition to) making grants to charities.
We select three of our independent variables based our hypothesis that large, professionally managed foundations are more likely to pursue policies that will preserve the real value of the foundation's assets over time. We define SIZE as the natural logarithm of the fair market value of total assets. We hypothesize that larger foundations adopt policies that maintain or increase the size of the foundation over time. Therefore, we expect SIZE to be negatively associated with DISTRIBUTIONS and positively associated with EXPENSES and with DELAY. Second, we define PROFEES as the ratio of professional fees to total operating and administrative expenses. Third, we define OFFCOMP as the ratio of compensation paid to officers, directors, and trustees to total operating and administrative expenses. We expect that foundations that either pay outsiders or pay internal managers for their expertise are also striving to maintain the size of the foundation over time, and so expect PROFEES and OFFCOMP be negatively associated with DISTRIBUTIONS and positively associated with EXPENSES and with DELAY.
We also hypothesize that a foundation will be more likely to pursue policies that will help ensure the survival and growth of the foundation when current contributions are low. We define NEWMONEY as the ratio of contributions to total revenue. We expect NEWMONEY be positively associated with DISTRIBUTIONS and negatively associated with EXPENSES and with DELAY.
We use these dependent and independent variables to estimate the following three models:
Because our database is a pooled cross-section, any joint estimation method will inflate the estimated t-statistics to the extent that the model error terms are not independent. Because we consider it likely that a given foundation's payout strategy is intemporally related, we estimate our three models using separate annual regressions and report average coefficient estimates and average t-statistics in our tables. Because we are concerned about the effects of extreme observations, we trim our sample at the top and bottom five percent level across each of our independent and dependent variables. We conducted a variety of robustness tests of these three models as discussed later in the paper. Table 1 contains a univariate analysis of our regression variables. The numbers used in Tables 3 and 4 use a cash basis of accounting (i.e., expenses are recorded only when cash is paid)
RESULTS
Univariate results
while those used to construct our variables as presented in Table 1 use an accrual accounting basis (i.e., expenses are recorded when the obligation to pay is fixed). Although the two methods of accounting will converge over the long run, inter-temporal differences arise in the short run.
An interesting finding is the wide variation in DISTRIBUTION. Although the median ratio is 1.11, suggesting that the median foundation pays out 11 percent above the legally minimum amount required, the 90 th percentile ratio is 2.22. At the tenth percentile, the payout ratio is only 0.83. 6 These findings suggest than debates surrounding the issue of foundation payout ratios should not necessarily focus on the average, or median, foundation because there is wide variation across the organizations. In particular, the average value of DISTRIBUTIONS of 1.38 suggests that, on average, foundations pay out significantly more than is required.
An alternative way of looking at the data is to compare the average qualifying distributions for the entire sample to the average of the prior year's distributable amount for the entire sample (rather than examining the average of the foundation specific ratio of qualifying distributions to prior year's distributable amounts). We present this analysis at the bottom of Table 4 , which shows that the average qualifying distribution is $2.682 million and the average prior-year's distributable amount is $2.037 million. These figures show that in the aggregate, our sample of foundations pays out an average of $1.29 for each $1.00 in required expenditures.
This finding is consistent with our analysis above and provides further evidence that concerns over foundations limiting their payouts to the legal minimum may not be justified. Although it is most certainly true that many foundations do pay out the legal minimum, and that for some foundations a substantial portion of those payouts are spent on administration rather than charitable grants, there is substantial variation across foundations with respect to both of these measures. Our results suggest that the average foundation spends relatively little on administration and pays out more than is legally required.
Turning back to the univariate statistics on Table 1 we find that the median value of DELAY is zero, which implies that fewer than half of the foundations in our sample delay satisfying the minimum distribution requirement until the following year. Recall that foundations are permitted to meet their current distribution requirements by paying out the necessary amounts either in the current year or in the subsequent year (payments beyond the subsequent year incur the excise tax). The mean DELAY ratio is 0.23, so more than three out of every four dollars of qualifying distributions are made in the current year instead of being postponed until the following year. If the foundation sector as a whole were delaying payments to charities as long as possible, we would expect to find a much higher value for DELAY. This finding suggests that most foundations choose to meet their minimum distribution requirements currently (i.e., in the current year) rather than putting off the required payments until the subsequent year.
There is substantial variation across the sector, with the 90 th percentile having a DELAY value of 0.89 (suggesting that they put off most of their required payments until the subsequent year) while the 10 th percentile is zero (suggesting that they make all required distributions in the current year). The mean (median) of EXPENSES is 0.23 (0.19). The 90 th (10 th ) percentile firm has an expense ratio of 0.46 (0.04), indicating substantial variation in this measure across foundations.
In our multivariate tests below, we try to determine the factors associated with variation in these dependent variables. With respect to our independent variables, we find that the average measures of the ratio of professional fees and officers' compensation to operating expenses (PROFEES and OFFCOMP respectively) are 0.29 and 0.19, suggesting that these two expenses combined account for about one-half of total foundation operating expenses. The mean (median) value of NEWMONEY is 0.10 (zero), which implies that fewer than half of the foundations in our sample received contributions in any particular year and contributions make up 10 percent of revenues for the average foundation. With respect to Model (3), we find support for our hypothesized association between a high expense to grant ratio (EXPENSES) in the case of officer compensation (a significant positive coefficient on OFFCOMP) and current donations (a significant negative coefficient on NEWMONEY). We find no support for our hypotheses relating to SIZE or PROFEES.
Multivariate results
In summary, our results suggest that the negative caricature of foundations as institutions that pay out as little and as late as possible to public charities is not an accurate description of the average foundation in the sector, particularly with respect to smaller foundations and foundations that receive larger amounts of current contributions. Although it is true that some foundations pay out only the legally minimum requirement as late as possible, in the aggregate our sample pays out 29 percent more than the legally required amount, makes most of those payments in the current year, and only spends nine cents on administration for every dollar of charitable grants.
However, despite this general impression of the foundation sector, we do find evidence consistent with some foundations that minimize and delay payouts. These foundations are larger, professionally managed, and have fewer current donations.
There could be several reasons that foundation managers attempt to minimize and defer current charitable expenditures. One possible explanation is that foundation managers are acting as prudent stewards over the foundation's assets. If a foundation's assets were depleted there would be fewer resources available in future periods. It is possible that foundation managers consider and trade-off the relative costs and benefits of making current grants to charities with those of saving for future grants at a time when the funds may be more sorely needed or may be more useful. 7 A second possible explanation is that foundation managers seek to perpetuate the existence of the foundation in order to continue their employment. As indicated in the beginning of our paper, our purpose is not to address which of these or other competing explanations explain foundation payout behavior. Our purpose was to provide a large sample analysis of foundation operations with respect to their distribution policies.
Robustness tests
We conducted a variety of tests to ensure the robustness of our results. The results as reported in Table 6 use the data from the full sample with a top and bottom five percent trim based on both the dependent and independent variables. In order to test the sensitivity of our results to data trimming, we re-estimated our results trimming our data using one percent increments from one percent to 10 percent. With respect to the first two models (i.e., the dependent variables are DISTRIBUTIONS and DELAY), the inferences of the results are not altered by using various trimming percentages. However, with respect to our third model (i.e., the dependent variable is EXPENSES), results change depending on the percentage trim used.
Results for NEWMONEY are robust to any amount of trimming. Results for OFFCOMP are robust to trimming from the three percent level or greater. Trimming the sample at the one or two percent level causes the estimate for OFFCOMP to become statistically insignificant.
Results for SIZE are robust to trimming from the two percent level or greater. Trimming the sample at the one percent level causes the estimate for SIZE to become statistically negative.
Results for PROFEES are robust to trimming from the four percent level or greater. Trimming the sample at the one, two, or three percent level causes the estimate for PROFEES to become statistically negative.
Because the inferences of our results stabilize when we trim using increasingly larger percentages, we attribute the sensitivity of OFFCOMP, SIZE, and PROFEES at smaller percentages of trimming to the effects of influential observations that are not removed by smaller Although observations identified using this method are likely to be influential, it is less likely that this method will identify all influential observations and therefore we resort to trimming the data as well as searching for potentially influential observations using this method.
As an additional robustness test, we re-estimated our models excluding SIZE or including the square of SIZE with no changes in inferences. With respect to the second model, which used the ratio of prior years' undistributed income to qualifying distributions as the dependent variable, we re-estimated the model using logistic analysis. In this case, the dependent variable was defined as one if the ratio was 90 percent or greater and zero otherwise. A ratio approaching one indicates that the foundation is exercising a virtual "just-in-time" payment method (by waiting until the last possible moment to pay out the legally required amounts). The statistical inferences of the logit analysis were not different from those of the ordinary least squares results presented in the paper.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study we examine how private foundations meet their legal requirement to spend at least five percent of their assets for charitable purposes. The conventional wisdom is that private foundations uniformly pay out the legally mandated five percent of assets to public charities. Our study of the largest foundations shows that these foundations distribute $1.29 for every dollar of legally required distributions. We find substantial variation within the sector in regards to both the level and timing of these distributions. Although this result seems to refute the conventional wisdom, it is important to note that the period under investigation coincided with a particularly strong stock market, potentially increasing foundations' propensities to pay out more than is legally required. Future research, using data from less well performing stock markets, will shed light on this finding.
In the second part of our analysis, we form and test hypotheses related to a foundation's propensity to retain, rather than pay out, its assets. We find that foundations that minimize distributions, delay distributions, and incur more charitable administrative expenses per dollar of grants have fewer donations as a percentage of revenue and more insiders' compensation as a percentage of expenses. Similar but weaker relations exist for large foundations and foundations that incur more professional fees as a percentage of expenses. Notes: All amounts are from the form 990-PF. 1 -Investment assets are those held for the production of income such as stocks, bonds, real estate investments, etc. 2 -Foundations are subject to a one or two percent excise tax on their net investment income. The rate of tax is dependent upon historical distributions. Generally, foundations are rewarded with the lower one percent rate when they increase their current-years grant payout over that of prior-years. 3 -IRC section 511 imposes an unrelated business income tax on the portion of foundations' net income that is from sources that do not proximately relate to their exempt purpose. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Ratio of total qualifying distributions to total prior-year's distributable amount. 1.29 1.41 1.31 1.10 1.12 1.14 ________________________________ Notes: All amounts are from the form 990-PF. 1-Program related investments are those that are not intended to generate investment income but rather whose purpose is to further a charitable purpose of the foundation. Examples include educational loans to individuals and low-interest loans to charities. 2-Foundation assets include property, plant, and equipment of the foundation. 3-Set asides are amounts that the IRS permits as current distributions, but will not be paid until some later date. _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Brody (1997) examines the broader questions of whether the non-profit sector should even have an endowment, whether this endowment should be controlled by private foundations instead of public charities, and whether private foundations should be allowed to exist in perpetuity. Hansmann (1990) criticizes the accumulation of wealth by universities on grounds of inter-generational equity. Current saving represents a transfer of wealth from the current generation to future generations, which seems inequitable in light of the general increase in economic prosperity over time. 3 The National Center for Charitable Statistics is a project of the Urban Institute and is given authority by the IRS to collect and distribute data on nonprofit organizations. Data can be requested at the Center's website: http://www.nccs.urban.org. Because data for 1998
is not yet available from the Center, we obtained this data directly from the IRS. 4 A valuation discount is permitted if the quick sale of the asset would depress the market price, as in the case of a large holding of a closely-held corporation.
5 See Sansing and Yetman (2002) for a discussion of the tax on net investment income. 6 Because excess distributions can be carried forward, a value of DISTRIBUTION less than one does not imply that the minimum distribution requirement has been violated. 7 Consider a manager of a foundation whose purpose is to alleviate the suffering of AIDS patients. The manager may make generous current grants to agencies which assist AIDS
